Executive Summary
It is mainly civilians that die as a result of contemporary armed conflicts: most succumb to disease and the effects of malnutrition but a significant number are slaughtered or suffer other forms of violent death. Policies to protect civilians during warfare, however, remain incoherent conceptually and poorly implemented in practice.
This working paper aims to advance debate in this area in three ways. First, it outlines a framework for thinking about the different dimensions that need to be addressed as part of a comprehensive and coherent civilian protection agenda:
The nature of the threats facing civilians during armed conflict. Here we distinguish between direct and indirect forms of harm and identify four important types of actors which often harm civilians: local armed forces, nonstate armed actors, self-defence groups, and foreign peacekeepers, soldiers and contractors.
The sources of the contemporary protection agenda stem from six interrelated streams of policy: 1) the development of international humanitarian law (IHL);
2) the adoption of protection agendas by humanitarian agencies; 3) the UN Security Council's focus on civilian protection; 4) the incorporation of protection mandates for peace operations; 5) the embracing of protection by some regional organizations; and 6) the political commitment to the Responsibility to Protect.
The pillars upon which the protection agenda should rest. We argue that a unified and comprehensive conception of protection should rest on the three pillars: of physical protection from immediate harm; satisfaction of needs essential for the sustenance of life; and the freedom to exercise fundamental human rights.
The principal agents of protection. These can be divided into five broad categories: states, local communities, humanitarian agencies, peacekeepers and international judicial institutions. While all these agents are potentially significant, to date, too little attention has been paid to understanding how to enhance the resilience of local communities.
Second, it identifies some important gaps and tensions in the current agenda. The first and arguably most significant gap is that between expectations and capabilities.
Profound gaps remain between what agents are expected to deliver (either by insiders or outsiders) and what they are capable of, or committed to, delivering. The second gap is the lack of operational guidance available for external agencies which wish to engage in civilian protection operations. A third problem is the lack of coherence and effective coordination between different actors. The fourth challenge is the tensions between self-protection activities of local communities and external agendas. Finally, there is a tension between the primary responsibility of the state and the way protection is commonly conceived and pursued. In particular, one of the least well understood elements of the -responsibility to protect‖ principle is the question of what states need to do to meet their obligations. Taken together, these problems have left the protection agenda somewhat limited and contradictory in certain respects.
Third, it emphasizes three issues that urgently require more detailed research:
How to enhance state capacity in relevant areas?
How to bolster the resilience of local communities at risk of harm?
How to strengthen the ability of peace operations to carry out relevant protection tasks?
When thinking about how to protect civilians in uncivil wars, political leaders should stop repeating the discredited cliché of -never again‖ and instead start investing serious resources into figuring out -who's next?‖ and how they might be protected.
Introduction
It is mainly civilians that die as a result of contemporary armed conflicts.
1 Although most of them succumb to disease and the effects of malnutrition a significant number are slaughtered or suffer other forms of violent death. 2 This fact is not unique to the contemporary era but the period since the end of the Cold War has witnessed an unprecedented level of international activity ostensibly aimed at reducing levels of civilian suffering during armed conflicts. Such activity resulted from the confluence of moral, political, legal and prudential considerations. First, the world's governments have intensified their political commitment to protect civilians in light of a strengthening moral norm that genocide and mass atrocities are unacceptable wherever and whenever they occur. 3 Second, there has been growing international support for the idea that states have a legal responsibility to respond to atrocities that are considered crimes under international human rights and humanitarian law. 4 Third, a variety of prudential calculations have persuaded states to take civilian protection issues more seriously. Specifically, it is widely recognized that it is harder to build peace and maintain order in environments where atrocities go unaddressed; 5 it is also well known that civilian deaths damage the legitimacy of counter-insurgency operations and make them harder to win; and it has become clear that relief workers face greater risks in circumstances where the combatant/non-combatant distinction is blurred.
Yet despite these commitments peacekeepers and other actors are not well prepared to deal with the daunting challenges posed by civilian protection agendas.
As one analysis of the twentieth century concluded, ‗[n]o century had better norms and worse realities' when it came to the protection of civilians in war. 6 Sometimes, the world reacted to crimes against civilians by despatching peacekeepers ‗without sufficient capacity, clear guidance and doctrine, adequate training, or a solid concept of operations to uphold mandates to -protect civilians‖.' 7 More often, no troops were dispatched at all to protect civilians. Not only have these sins of omission and commission badly damaged the reputation of liberal states and international institutions, they have facilitated the massacre of thousands of civilians in the world's war zones.
Efforts to strengthen the protection of civilians are inhibited by a lack of consensus on what protection ought to entail, where the sources of protection lay and how those sources relate to one another, which actors should be engaged in protection, and how their activities should be coordinated. As a result, whilst considerable activity has occurred, the contemporary agenda remains limited and incoherent in some important respects. This article aims to advance the debate in three ways. First, we propose a framework for thinking about the different dimensions of a comprehensive and coherent civilian protection agenda: the nature of the problem i.e.
threats facing civilians during armed conflict; the sources of the contemporary protection agenda; the pillars upon which the protection agenda should rest; and the principal agents of protection. Second, we identify several problems with the current agenda: the gap between capabilities and expectations; the lack of operational guidance; coordination and coherence problems; the tensions between internal and external modes of protection; and the role of the state. We finish by suggesting three important areas for further research and action: enhancing state capacity in relevant areas; bolstering the resilience of local communities at risk of harm; and strengthening the ability of peacekeepers to protect civilians.
The Problem: Threats to Civilians during Armed Conflict
Many factors contribute to civilian suffering during periods of armed conflict. Viewed in the abstract, this makes for a broad and daunting agenda which can encourage a tendency to prioritize everything and thereby nothing. However, establishing priorities is easier to do with reference to specific empirical settings. The starting point for analysis and action must therefore be identifying the ways in which civilians are threatened in both a general sense and with reference to specific armed conflicts.
Or as the ICRC has put it, analysis must start with an assessment of who does what to whom?
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In general terms it is useful to distinguish between direct and indirect forms of harm. 9 In some instances civilians will be the direct target of atrocities committed by a potentially wide range of actors. Any list of atrocities is potentially very long but a useful starting point is the seventeen types of violations identified by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone in its study of that country's civil war.
These were: abduction, amputation, arbitrary detention, assault/beating, destruction of property, drugging, extortion, forced cannibalism, forced displacement, forced labour, forced recruitment, killing, looting, physical torture, rape, sexual abuse, and sexual slavery. Civilians can also be harmed indirectly. Among the most common forms of indirect harm are those which occur through loss of livelihood and displacement (which are central factors exacerbating the likelihood of civilians succumbing to disease or malnutrition) and instances of mistaken or unintentional killing through inaccurate bombardment and/or targeting or the use of indiscriminate weapons (e.g.
antipersonnel mines and cluster bombs).
With this broad distinction in mind it is important to understand which actors threaten civilians in armed conflicts and why. Here four categories of actors are particularly important:
Local armed forces: these are likely to cause harm to civilians either when they are ordered to do so, or when they are undisciplined and/or unprofessional.
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Unofficial, non-state armed actors: including insurgencies, paramilitaries, militias and organized groups of thugs.
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Self-defence groups: which might emerge from noble motives (such as defending livestock or community property) but degenerate into more predatory organizations.
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Foreign peacekeepers, soldiers and/or contractors: Whether it is the scandals at Abu Ghraib, the behaviour of Blackwater employees in Iraq, or UN peacekeepers engaging in organized criminal activities and/or sexual exploitation and abuse of locals, local civilians often suffer harm at the hands of foreigners.
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The subsidiary question is why, despite the very clear prohibition of such acts, civilians are targeted. Although the relevant literature remains divided, it seems clear that both the direct and indirect targeting of civilians requires some form of justificatory ideology. 14 These ideologies have tended to take two forms: those that reject the application of civilian immunity to certain racial, national, ethnic, religious, linguistic, sexual or physical groups (e.g. Nazism, extreme nationalism, doctrine of collective responsibility, Stalinism) and those that privilege perceived necessity over the moral and legal restraints on war. 15 Both types are more likely to facilitate the targeting of civilians in contexts of impunity, where there are no immediate negative consequences for violating the norm of civilian immunity. 16 In such contexts, belligerents may target civilians in order to achieve tactical goals at lower costs to themselves (e.g. as a strategy of counter-insurgency or a tactic for recruiting child soldiers), to accomplish strategic objectives by claiming and -cleansing‖ particular territories and eliminating whole groups; to punish communities for supporting the enemy; and to violently assert control over the civilian populations. 17 In addition, leaders might create a culture of impunity towards the abuse of the civilian population as payment for military services -civilians can be killed, raped, kidnapped into (often sexual) servitude and have their assets taken or destroyed as a form of payment.
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From this necessarily brief overview of how and why civilians are targeted in war, it is clear that the protection agenda needs to include measures designed to challenge the enabling conditions and sometimes stand between the civilian population and their tormentors.
Sources of Protection
Contemporary interest in protection stems from six interconnected streams of thought and policy which developed in reaction to different aspects of civilian suffering during war:
the development of international humanitarian law (IHL); the adoption of protection agendas by humanitarian agencies;
the UN Security Council's focus on civilian protection; the incorporation of protection mandates for peace operations; the embracing of protection by some regional organizations;
the political commitment to the Responsibility to Protect.
Although interrelated, the streams reflect the particular concerns and interests of the respective norm carriers and thus emphasize different components of protection. This has left important gaps and tensions in the contemporary protection agenda which are addressed in part 5 of this article.
The Development of International Humanitarian Law
The global effort to strengthen IHL -as well as the concomitant development of international criminal law -has become the legal bedrock for civilian protection. As is well known, IHL had its origins in the mid-late nineteenth century with the development of the US Government's -General Orders No. 100‖ (better known as the Lieber code) and the emergence of the Red Cross movement inspired by Henry Dunant. 19 After the Second World War, IHL was developed and codified in the four Geneva Conventions (1949), two additional protocols (1977) , and in a range of protocols covering the use of Certain Conventional Weapons (1980, 1995, 1996, 2008 23 To the extent that other emergency relief organizations referred to protection, they typically saw it as a natural counterpart to the impartial delivery of humanitarian assistance. This began to change in the 1990s when some organizations recognized that effective humanitarian assistance was dependent on security and stability. 24 In extreme cases, this view noted that assistance without protection could produce the so-called -well fed dead‖ -civilians given food, housing and medical support by humanitarian agencies only to be killed by armed groups. The result was a broader approach to protection by a variety of actors; from Oxfam to the international financial institutions. 25 This, in turn, produced a raft of different theories and strategies for the development, management and assessment of protection programs. 26 While the expansion of the protection agenda was important, it highlighted significant areas of ambiguity to humanitarian work and in some cases, perhaps most notably Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), encouraged a reaction against the idea that humanitarian agencies alone can deliver protection.
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The UN Security Council
Since 1998, the UN Security Council has explicitly debated a relatively broad and unfocused civilian protection agenda that has encompassed compliance with IHL, operational issues connected to peace operations and humanitarian access, as well as the Council's role in responding to emergencies and tackling disarmament issues. humanitarian access and the creation of a working group to explore avenues for translating the Council's commitment to protection into tangible outcomes for endangered populations. 31 Neither elicited much support.
Peacekeeping Mandates
The Council has also supported the civilian protection agenda through the mandates it has crafted for peace operations. Although peacekeeping operations have sometimes contained human rights components, it was very rare for civilian protection to be considered a core part of the mission. 32 It was not until the publication of the UN's Panel on Peace Operations -the so-called -Brahimi Report‖ -in 2000 that peacekeepers who witnessed violence against civilians should officially -be presumed to be authorized to stop it, within their means‖. 33 Starting in 1999 with the UN mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), the Security Council has regularly invoked Chapter VII of the UN Charter to create protection mandates, albeit while inserting some important geographical, temporal and capabilities-based caveats. 34 
Regional Arrangements
The protection agenda has also been fostered at the regional level, especially in Europe and Africa. The foundations for Europe's engagement with civilian protection were laid in the 1970s with the Helsinki Accords. Over time, these provided the basis for a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) mechanism which by the 1990s incorporated specific references to protection issues, including the protection of children and protection against torture. 35 When the CSCE was transformed into an organization -the OSCE -in 1995, it was given additional institutional capacities in relation to human rights. Among those capacities was the establishment of the High Commissioner for National Minorities (HCNM). This was intended to employ quiet diplomacy to help states protect the rights of national minorities and prevent the escalation of ethnic divisions into violent conflict. 36 Beginning with its engagement in the Bosnian conflict, NATO has also incorporated the protection of civilians into its crisis management work more broadly. 37 As part of its common foreign and security policy the EU also started to develop a civilian 
Pillars of Protection
Ironically, one of the principal strengths of the civilian protection norm-the breadth and depth of the normative consensus underpinning it-is also a source of weakness because there is little agreement across the six streams about what protection means, what it entails and which agents are best placed to provide it. In our view, a unified and comprehensive conception of protection should rest on three pillars:
1. the physical protection from immediate harm;
2. the satisfaction of needs essential for the sustenance of life;
3. the freedom to exercise fundamental human rights.
Although each element is usually emphasized by particular agents of protection (i.e.
the first by military peacekeepers, the second by humanitarian agencies, the third by mandated actors), any holistic conception of protection must incorporate all three.
Physical protection from immediate harm
This entails numerous tasks but it is useful to distinguish two broad types. Direct protection implies measures designed to protect civilians under immediate threat of physical harm. Measures such as guarding and demilitarizing refugee and IDP camps, patrolling villages and establishing checkpoints, protecting safe corridors, using force to maintain humanitarian access or coerce perpetrators of abuses, as well as providing personal protection to vulnerable individuals can be considered direct forms of protection because they involve the use of military and/or police personnel to deter threats and protect civilians who are likely to come under attack. Although nonmilitary actors can play a part in risk reduction and reporting it is important to recognize that unarmed civilian organizations are rarely able to directly protect civilians in imminent danger. 42 Indirect measures contribute to the establishment of an environment conducive to civilian protection but do not provide immediate protection. Military and police measures such as enforcement operations against armed groups, securing humanitarian access, and apprehending those suspected of crimes against the civilian population and civilian measures such as disarmament and demobilization, capacity-building and training, integrating protection considerations into activities such as camp design, improving the quality of information provided to local communities, and measures to strengthen the rule of law, may create the necessary environment for protection and reduce the likelihood of attacks but they do not protect civilians in immediate danger. 43 The satisfaction of needs essential for the sustenance of life
As noted above, most civilian casualties of war result from indirect effects, such as disease and deprivation, and these indirect risks are intensified and multiplied by displacement. 44 As such, protection should be concerned with preventing and mitigating the most damaging indirect effects that armed conflicts have on civilians.
Oxfam, for example, envisage protection as involving the provision of the necessities of life (food, shelter, medicine, means of earning a living) and freedom from impediments on those necessities. 45 Among other things, the satisfaction of needs requires support for local coping strategies, access to stricken populations, the prevention of displacement where possible, and provision of safe havens when needed. 46 
The freedom to exercise fundamental human rights
This involves maintaining an environment conducive to the satisfaction of rights granted to individuals by international human rights and humanitarian law. One of the first attempts to develop a protection agenda for humanitarian agencies, spearheaded by the ICRC (1996-2000), produced a consensus that protection encompassed -all activities aimed at ensuring full respect for the rights of the individual in accordance with the letter and the spirit of the relevant bodies of law, i.e.
human rights law, international humanitarian law, and refugee law.‖ 47 Focusing on already existing rights helps to clarify the extent and focus of the protection agenda, set minimum standards, and provide common benchmarks for evaluating behaviour.
However, there are inherent limits to what a rights based approach can achieve. The scope of rights is limited because not all states have ratified the relevant treaties and there is a fundamental disconnect between formal obligations and levels of compliance. Moreover, educating people about their rights is only part of the equation: they also need to be able to exercise those rights. In the eye of the storm, such opportunities are rarely available. 48 
Agents of Protection
To be effective over time, protection clearly requires action in all three areas identified above. However, we also need to be clear about the strengths and limitations of the different agents of protection. We suggest that there are five main agents of protection: states, local communities, humanitarian agencies, peacekeepers and international judicial institutions. Each agent acts according to its own conception of protection and while there is sometimes coherence and coordination, this is ad hoc and patchy at best. This section evaluates the role of each of these agents in order to identify critical limitations in the contemporary protection agenda.
States
States not only have the primary responsibility to protect civilians, they are also usually the principal agent of protection. Indeed, a variety of social contract theories insist that the first duty of states is to protect their populations from insecurity. 49 As such, it is only when a government fails to protect its population that the question of alternative agents of protection arises. This might occur for a number of reasons. In one scenario, well-meaning governments might lack the capacity to effectively protect their citizens from rebel groups. In other cases, governments may be divided, with some factions committed to protecting their populations but lacking the capacity to effectively control the state's military forces. In situations of state collapse there ceases to be any meaningful distinction between the government's armed forces and various militia groups. On other occasions governments pursue a deliberate policy of targeting segments of their population. 50 These different dynamics are important because the precise nature of the state's failure to protect will shape the opportunities for and constraints upon the adoption of external measures. Clearly, states lacking the capacity to protect populations from rebels or external forces are more likely to request international assistance than those that have deliberately targeted civilians. In these latter cases external agents will be confronted by major additional obstacles associated with the norm of sovereignty and non-intervention. Most notably, humanitarian agencies will not be granted unfettered access and will be forced to negotiate and cooperate with the perpetrators of crimes against civilians to gain limited access. In addition, the UN Security Council's deep reluctance to authorize peace operations without host state consent means that a mixture of diplomatic skill and coercion will be required to permit the deployment of peacekeepers. These political problems are eased somewhat in cases of state collapse but they present a different range of logistical and security problems. 51 In most cases, however, external agents of protection will be required to cooperate with a government that has failed to protect its civilian population either because of volition, neglect or incapacity.
The range of measures that states can take to protect their populations is too vast to list here in any but the most perfunctory fashion, but it is useful to think of the state's role in relation to the three pillars of protection identified above. First and foremost, physical protection requires that states abide by IHL and ensure that their security forces understand and respect the law. In addition, states should uphold the rule of law and ensure that key crimes against civilians -genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity -are written into the domestic penal code and that individual criminal responsibility for these crimes is established.
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States also play a significant role in the satisfaction of life-sustaining needs.
Many famines and disease outbreaks that accompany armed conflict and disproportionately affect the civilian population were products of either deliberate policy or wilful neglect by states. 53 The In relation to the protection of fundamental rights, the most obvious way in which states can protect civilians is by signing, ratifying and -most importantlyimplementing relevant legal treaties, including the nine -core‖ treaties identified by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and the guiding principles relating to the treatment of IDPs. 54 When states lack the resources or technical expertise to properly implement these core human rights treaties, external assistance is also available through institutions such as the Office of UN Human Rights Commissioner.
One hopeful development is the establishment of National Human Rights Institutions. 55 Although there are various models, these institutions share certain similarities in their role and function. 56 They are a particularly important component of a state's protection regime because they can ensure that rights are interpreted and implemented in a context-specific fashion, monitor patterns of rights violation, oversee the integration of rights into national policy, and provide an institutional setting for individuals to lodge complaints.
In situations where a state is failing to protect its population, the foremost aim of international engagement must be to encourage the state to change course and fulfil its obligations, either by ceasing attacks, stepping up efforts to uphold the rule of law, or requesting external assistance. The principal means to achieve this is diplomacy. to humanitarian agencies in wake of Cyclone Nargis. 59 Sometimes, persuasion will not suffice and coercive techniques may be required. Part of the problem is that coercion (whether military or economic) has a poor record of success.
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Local Communities
External actors often overlook the fact that populations in danger usually take (often quite effective) measures to protect themselves. 61 External actors are seldom present in large numbers in the eye of an emergency when most of the killing and displacement is actually underway. 62 Typically, international assistance arrives after the peak of the violence. 63 In the inevitable gap between a crisis erupting and outside help arriving (if it does at all), civilians have to make provision for their own protection by escaping violence, protecting their property and reducing threats. 64 Modes of self-protection fall into three broad types: in situ self-protection;
flight from danger; and armed resistance. In situ self-protection involves measures to protect the community from direct attack and from the deprivation caused by violent conflict. Tactics include travelling only by particular routes or only at night, gathering in large groups for added protection or dispersing into smaller groups for concealment, spending time in different locales by tending farms during the day and hiding in the surrounding countryside at night, concealing vulnerable groups or belongings at night, establishing -neighbourhood watch‖-type systems to provide early warning of impending risk, and paying bribes (in cash, food or assets) to government agents, rebels or vigilante groups in return for protection. 65 Protection against deprivation is fostered through the development of -coping economies.‖
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Groups use their ever-decreasing asset base in whatever way they can to either survive or prop-up their declining standard of living. Where possible, they might engage in illegal production and smuggling to augment their income or pillage money, supplies and assets from neighbours, ethnic minorities, groups associated with the -enemy,‖ or international humanitarian agencies. Indeed, humanitarian workers tend to be targeted more by small armed groups looking for cash, supplies and assets than by larger armed groups, even in cases where these larger groups are responsible for most of the attacks on civilians.
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A second self-protection strategy is flight: leaving the area under threat.
Decisions about flight are rarely arbitrary. 68 People typically flee to where they believe it will be safer, either because of familial or identity based relationships or the promise of assistance from national authorities or humanitarian agencies. Often, those who stay behind. 70 Compounding the obvious humanitarian problems associated with displacement is the political problem that IDPs remain under the nominal authority of the government that has either directly threatened them or manifestly failed to protect them. 71 As we noted earlier, those authorities often deny humanitarian agencies the access they need to support displaced people, intensifying the challenge of operating in an insecure environment.
A third way in which local communities might respond to imminent threats is through violent resistance. One tactic is to send money, assets and recruits to major rebel groups. In 1998-99, for example, many Kosovar Albanians joined the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) simply as a way of protecting their properties and families.
People might also band together to establish community militia to protect themselves.
An example of this was the various self-defense groups (kamajors) that emerged during the civil war in Sierra Leone. 72 But the phenomenon is more common than generally acknowledged. In Darfur, for example, one of the reasons for the apparent fragmenting of the rebel movement was the emergence of dozens of small armed organizations, many of which were groups of armed men formed to protect their community.
All these activities create additional risks. The decision to remain in situ in order to protect property and belongings leaves local communities exposed to potential attack, and the risks usually increase with time. While the various in situ coping strategies tend to produce better outcomes than flight, the longer a conflict persists the less feasible those strategies usually become as a community's asset base dwindles over time. Likewise, paying government agents, militia groups or vigilantes for protection might enhance physical protection in the short-term, but is likely to create further risks in the future. Payments encourage predatory behaviour on the part of established armed groups and create an incentive structure for the establishment of new groups. Moreover, insurance payments tie a local community to a particular armed faction and expose the civilian population to retribution and punishment from other armed groups. Similarly, other coping strategies such as engaging in illegal trade or using force to seize assets from other groups might buy a degree of short-term protection but inadvertently contribute to the further deterioration of security, exposing the community to potentially heightened risks further down the line. As noted above, flight is a particularly high-risk strategy. Although it may sometimes represent the only feasible form of physical protection, displaced people suffer heightened deprivation and the community risks losing most, if not all, of its assets, including its land. Finally, although armed resistance might provide a short-term palliative, it makes matters worse just as often as it helps. Sometimes, armed resistance provokes reprisals against civilians as in the case of Kosovo where the KLA's use of violence prompted the Serbian authorities to escalate from a strategy of political and civil rights violations to a campaign of ethnic cleansing. 73 In other circumstances, as in Darfur, self-defense groups become part of the problem. Less well equipped and funded than larger militia groups, self-defense groups use violence against civilians, aid agencies and sometimes peacekeepers to secure assets, money and weapons. 74 In short, therefore, flight, resistance and succumbing to extortion may all buy a degree of short-term protection, but this protection is uncertain, incomplete, risky and might increase risks in the longer-term.
Humanitarian Agencies
The traditional view of humanitarian agencies was that they could contribute to protection in three main ways: 1) they could deliver life-sustaining assistance; 2) they could use their influence to support individuals and groups within government that can promote respect for civilians; and 3) they could -bear witness' to crimes against civilians (the hope being that the prospect of NGOs reporting on the actions of perpetrators might affect the latter's calculations). 75 Unfortunately, the evidence suggested that humanitarian presence tended to have only marginal impact on the protection of civilians, especially in frontline regions. In Darfur, for example, humanitarian presence did decrease the reported harassment of civilians and improved freedom of movement but these effects were most noticeable in areas not considered strategically important by the belligerents and only in the immediate vicinity of the respective agency's offices. Elsewhere, presence had little bearing on the protection of civilians. 76 More recently, it has been recognized that humanitarian agencies can add to their potential protection activities not least by discouraging local communities from adopting risky behaviour and improving local lines of communication and hence decision-making. 77 One recent report identified six strategies in particular that have been used by humanitarian agencies:
1. Use humanitarian assistance to reduce vulnerability by targeting aid at vulnerable groups or at groups that might cause harm to others as part of their coping strategies.
2. Help prevent displacement by providing secure access to land, helping communities to sustain themselves and reducing dependency on displacement camps. is in need of protection‖. 81 Typically, the protection of civilians by military peacekeepers involves one or both of two types of activity. The first involves the positioning of military forces between the civilian population and those that threaten them in order to deter and respond to attacks. 82 The second, less frequent type of activity involves measures designed to eliminate or restrict the activities of armed groups that threaten civilians.
In the first type, protection usually involves measures short of offensive force such as erecting military barriers around civilian populations, patrolling at-risk areas, and gradually reducing threats through negotiated disarmament. 83 Sometimes, even if forces are not explicitly mandated or configured for civilian protection tasks, the areas in and around peacekeeping bases and offices get treated as de facto -safe havens‖ as civilians relocate there in search of protection. 84 Specific tasks given to peacekeepers include, discouraging the abuse of civilians and improving stability by patrolling, defending civilians under imminent threat, protecting civilians in transit and upon return to their homes, taking special measures to protect women and girls from sexual and gender-based violence, supporting institution-building in areas such as human rights and law enforcement, protecting and assisting humanitarian workers by defending their camps and convoys and securing access to needy populations, delivering humanitarian assistance, defending displacement and refugee camps from external attack and providing security inside camps, separating combatants from noncombatants in refugee camps, and defending -safe zones‖ for civilians. 85 Peacekeepers may use force more coercively to protect civilians by conducting rescue operations to free civilians kidnapped by criminal groups or repel attacks on the civilian population. There are at least three reasons for this.
The first is the enduring gap between expectations and capabilities caused by a combination of demand-side and supply-side factors. On the demand side, states are typically reluctant to consent to the intervention of a large and well-equipped peacekeeping force unless they calculate that it is in their interests to do so, which is rare. On the supply-side, international society -and its wealthiest members especially -have grown increasingly reluctant to commit troops to civilian protection missions outside their areas of strategic interest. 92 As a result, most operations do not have the capabilities needed to provide comprehensive protection to civilian populations. 93 This is evident if we recall two rules of thumb commonly used to calculate the necessary force size for civilian protection operations. 94 The first is based on the assumption that 2-10 troops are required for every 1,000 inhabitants within the crisis zone. The second method is based on the protection force being at least the size of the largest indigenous armed force. On these indicators several peace operations remained significantly under-staffed (see table 1). The result is that even relatively large peacekeeping missions are seldom able to provide protection throughout their area of operations. Consequently, military protection efforts usually focus on specific geographic areas, be they -safe havens/areas/zones,‖ -safe corridors‖ for transit, or undesignated areas close to the peacekeepers' bases. The rationale for designating safe areas is that through the concentration of force, peacekeepers can carve out secure areas. 96 The problem with this approach is that it only protects those civilians that are able to make it into the safe zone, encourages displacement as civilians flee their homes for the safety of the safe zone, and facilitates the concentration of civilian populations making them more vulnerable to atrocities if the peacekeepers fail to defend the zone (as happened in Srebrenica in 1995). In addition, protecting civilians in one area leaves them vulnerable to violence elsewhere: by default, creating -safe zones‖ renders other areas -danger zones‖. 97 The second problem is that there is no clear doctrine to guide military forces in their civilian protection activities. The UN's recent -principles and guidelines‖ document for peacekeeping operations identifies civilian protection as requiring -concerted and coordinated action among the military, police and civilian components‖ of a peace operation and that it -must be mainstreamed into the planning and conduct of [the UN's] core activities.‖ Yet it did not spell out what protection entails or how it could be achieved. 98 Similarly, key states such as Canada, the United States, the UK, the Netherlands, France and India as well as organizations like NATO, the EU, ECOWAS and the AU have also been slow to include specific guidelines on civilian protection in their military doctrines. 99 While their doctrine points to civilian protection as a possible role, none singles it out or elaborates on how military force should be used for protection purposes. 100 As such, civilian protection activities remain ad hoc and dependent on the initiative and ingenuity of individual commanders. 101 This poses a particular problem in multinational operations where national rotations and priorities make it difficult to establish or implement long-term strategies.
Third, it has proven difficult to eliminate threats to civilians entirely and using force against militia groups may make it harder to secure their cooperation in the 
International Judicial Institutions
International judicial institutions such as the International Criminal Court (ICC), special tribunals such as those created for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and hybrid national tribunals (e.g. in Sierra Leone and Cambodia) contribute to protection by holding some of the perpetrators of atrocities to account. Proponents argue that by ending impunity such institutions will help deter would-be perpetrators of atrocities and afford legal protection to the victims. 103 The idea that some crimes are so heinous as to fall under universal jurisdiction is not new but efforts to internationalize and institutionalize individual criminal responsibility in the wake of the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials were stymied by political disputes. The first tentative steps were taken in the mid-1990s when the Security Council established ad hoc tribunals to prosecute the perpetrators of grave crimes in Bosnia and Rwanda. 104 The Rome Statute establishing the ICC in 1998 held that the court's jurisdiction could be invoked when a state party proved unwilling or unable to investigate evidence pointing to the commission of widespread and systematic war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. The ICC prosecutor could initiate proceedings in cases where s/he was able to persuade a panel of judges that a case fell under the court's jurisdiction, where a complaint was made by a signatory state, or when a case was referred to the prosecutor by the Security Council.
The Security Council also reserved the right to postpone investigations by one year. It is thus far too early to pronounce on the court's effectiveness or its potential to deter the commission of atrocities. Early anecdotal evidence from Darfur and Uganda, however, suggests that while the threat of prosecution is sometimes factored into perpetrators' calculations, it has failed to prevent the commission of crimes.
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This brings us to an additional problem, which is that criminal proceedings might undermine political efforts to end crimes against civilians because the threat of future prosecution provides a disincentive for leaders to negotiate an end to violence, accept the deployment of peacekeepers or step down from power. 106 This issue has been widely debated in relation to the ICC's attempts to indict Sudan's President Bashir and the leader of Uganda's Lords Resistance Army, Joseph Kony.
Gaps and Tensions in the Protection Agenda
Although recent decades have witnessed considerable activity directed towards the protection of civilians in war and significant progress has been made, especially in the humanitarian sector, important gaps and tensions remain.
The first, and arguably most significant, is the gap between expectations and capabilities. In short, across each actor type identified in the previous section there are profound gaps between what agents are expected to deliver (either by insiders or outsiders) and what they are capable of, or committed to, delivering. Thus: some states simply lack the capacity to protect their citizens, and many others lack the political will to do so; humanitarian agencies cannot sustain life in the face of immediate physical threats and find it difficult to deliver aid effectively in insecure environments; although military peacekeepers have the theoretical capacity to provide physical security more often than not they are deployed without the numbers, equipment or expertise necessary to complete a civilian protection mandate; and while IHL promises an end to impunity it lacks the judicial authority or policing capacity to deliver protection on the ground. In these four instances, expectations about what ought to happen do not match reality. In some cases, this may be because those expectations are unrealistic. As MSF has repeatedly argued, it is a mistake to think that humanitarian agencies are able to protect civilians from direct harm. But in other cases, the gap is a product of choice prompted by countervailing interests. The clearest example here is the peacekeeping gap. The principal reason for the gap between the number of peacekeepers needed to protect civilians and the number deployed is international society's inability to muster sufficient political will.
Even if sufficient resources were found to close the expectations-capabilities gap, lack of operational guidance for the UN and regional organizations would remain a problem. Put simply, while there has been an outpouring of guidance for humanitarian NGOs, the proliferation of civilian protection mandates has not been met with a similar proliferation of guidance about how to -do‖ civilian protection in the field. This problem is most acute in relation to the role of host states and peacekeepers but it is also apparent in relation to the way that humanitarian agencies provide protection and in the absence of guidance on how local communities might better protect themselves. In relation to peacekeepers, although the Security Council has increased the frequency of its civilian protection mandates it has not issued clear guidance as to what this entails. This includes a failure to clarify the meaning of caveats referring to the mission's -areas of deployment,‖ -capabilities‖ and the need to protect civilians -without prejudice to the responsibility‖ of the host country. 107 In the absence of clear guidance, actors are left to make decisions on an ad hoc basis, without the benefits of past lessons learned and best practices.
A third problem is the lack of coherence and effective coordination. analysts to argue that closer ties between aid agencies and military forces places the former at greater risk by undermining the protection afforded to them by neutrality. 110 Finally, there is potential for incoherence between agents who might be encouraging or discouraging flight. We noted earlier that when peacekeepers are deployed they tend to create explicit or de facto -safe zones,‖ which encourage flight. This might undermine the efforts of local communities and aid agencies to remain in situ. Beyond the study of sanctions -which evidence suggests can often be counterproductive -we have little idea about the strategies needed to persuade states to fulfill their responsibility to protect civilians. 112 More research is needed to understand which agents should be responsible for this effort, how it might impact on humanitarian neutrality, the potential effect of ICC investigations and indictments, and which tactics have proven effective in persuading states to cooperate when external assistance is needed.
Together, these problems have left the protection agenda somewhat limited and contradictory in certain respects. In the final section we identify some areas which need much greater research and attention if these problems are to be overcome.
Advancing the Civilian Protection Agenda
Our suggested protection agenda rests on the three pillars of physical protection from immediate harm; the provision of vital needs; and the freedom to exercise fundamental human rights. Implementing such a broad agenda clearly requires a multidimensional approach involving a wide range of actors, many of whom have very different goals, interests and worldviews. While a subject as politically sensitive as civilian protection is unlikely to produce anything approaching universal consensus -and it is certainly not our intention to argue that any single actor should assume responsibility for the totality of the agenda -it is important to address some of the major deficiencies of current thinking and practice. Instead of a conclusion, we propose three areas that require much greater attention if civilian protection is to be made more effective.
Enhance State Capacity
Fundamentally, the long-term solution to the protection problem revolves in large part around the conundrum of how to build political communities (probably states) that are both willing and able to protect all their citizens from atrocity. After war, this agenda inevitably raises several difficult dilemmas relating to legitimacy, security, political economy, autonomy and coordination. 113 At other times, the trick will be to incentivize governments to protect their populations. In general, we suggest that it is crucial to enhance state capacities in three broad areas. First, the country's security forces (military, police, and intelligence) need to be professionalized and brought under civilian control. 114 Of course, once a crisis has broken, security sector reform programmes will not provide instant solutions to the problems of predatory soldiers and dysfunctional security organizations. In the longer-term, however, such programmes are a necessary part of the protection agenda. Second, policies need to strengthen the rule of law by building effective policing and judicial systems. Where appropriate, national efforts can draw support from international institutions such as
Interpol or the ICC to help end the culture of impunity for perpetrators of atrocities.
The third area concerns systems of state governance and the questions of who rules and how? In the long-term, incentives need to be created to encourage systems of governance -by and for the people,‖ and which establish checks and balances upon executive power in order to promote respect for the rights of individuals and minorities. A reasonable place to start is to engineer structures of governance that stress republicanism's emphasis on deliberation, representation and constitutionalism. 115 
Enhance the Resilience of Local Communities
Until states prove both willing and able to protect their civilians, more action needs to be taken to strengthen the resilience of local communities at risk of severe harm. As an initial step, this will require investigation into what factors are most associated with episodes of severe political instability and what factors can stabilize region's on the brink of crises. 116 Naturally, the enduring strength of sovereignty and the noninterference norm will make it particularly difficult to take action in precisely those communities most at risk from their own governments. But such difficulties do not warrant abandoning the objective of enhancing community resilience. In order for this to happen, outsiders need a better understanding of local coping strategies and how communities manage various kinds of crises from famine to physical assaults. Then these activities need to be supported. Ideally, understanding can be built through dialogue and protracted engagement with communities and mapping techniques can be used to build a clear picture of the sources of protection in given regions. In the midst of an emergency, however, there is neither the time nor capacity to conduct these types of activities to the extent needed. In the immediate onset of crises, greater emphasis must go towards limiting displacement not least through attempts to keep local coping economies functioning and ensuring humanitarian access to as much of the at-risk population as possible. In dire circumstances where atrocities are already being committed, external actors may need to think more carefully about how to collaborate with local armed resistance groups, as well as trying to prevent these groups transforming from -protectors‖ into -predators‖. 117 Of course, knowing which armed groups to support and which to undermine will always be incredibly difficult and subject to contestation but future collaborative choices will be made easier if more research can shed light on why certain armed groups engage in predatory behaviour.
Strengthen Peace Operations 118
When states and various local community groups fail to protect civilians, external parties should assume a greater burden of the responsibility. As the most significant form of such external engagement, peace operations need to be better prepared to carry out or facilitate protection activities across the three pillars discussed above. In general terms, this will mean enhancing the level of (human, financial, and material) resources available to peacekeepers. This brings us to the question of how to encourage troop contributing countries to commit the necessary resources to peace operations in an era of declining commitment on the part of the West. 119 One key to recalibrating national interests may be stress the link between strategic interests, the protection of civilians, and the effectiveness of peace operations. Other components of strengthening peace operations include developing relevant doctrine for the military and policing tasks associated with civilian protection, and preparing peacekeepers for the considerable challenges ahead by investing in rigorous training programs both well before and after their deployment. 120 On the other hand, as peace operations will increasingly be judged on how they perform with regard to civilian protection, peacekeepers who abuse their position and inflict harm upon locals must be publicly punished.
When thinking about how to protect civilians in uncivil wars it would therefore make more sense for political leaders to stop repeating the discredited cliché of -never again‖ and instead start investing serious resources into figuring out -who's next?‖ and how they might be protected. 
